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Fatigue : l'EASA accusée !


The European agency responsible for aviation safety across the EU has been accused of gross maladministration by British pilots.

The British Airline Pilots’ Association (BALPA), which represents over 80% of British airline pilots, has submitted a formal complaint to the European Ombudsman who has responsibility for investigating such cases of poor governance within European agencies.

BALPA’s complaint is that the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has breached its own terms of reference in the way it has put together its proposals to change pilots’ working hour limits; limits which are supposed to prevent fatigue. In particular the EASA group that formulated the proposals appear to be very short on relevant medical and scientific qualification and – astonishingly – EASA took no steps to record or manage conflicts of interest within the group.

BALPA’s General Secretary, Jim McAuslan, said, ‘The UK government will be represented at a crucial EU meeting on 10th and 11th July at which they will be asked to support these EASA rules which will substantially dilute the existing UK rules. We have written to the Minister to inform him of our Ombudsman complaint and asking him to support our cause and insist that the rule-making process is done properly.

'Regrettably the Minister has shown little stomach so far for a fight with EU bureaucrats. BALPA's battle is therefore likely to move to the EU parliament which has been poorly served by an agency that lacks transparency, skill and knowledge and yet has been given the power to draft rules which will have a big impact on every airline passenger in Europe.'
On attend bien sûr que le SNPL et la FENVAC fassent de même...

08:34 Écrit par HMC | Commentaires (0)


ASIANA 214 : le NTSB critiqué


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July 12, 2013


WASHINGTONThe National Transportation Safety Board apologizes for inaccurate and offensive names that were mistakenly confirmed as those of the pilots of Asiana flight 214, which crashed at San FranciscoInternationalAirport on July 6.

Earlier today, in response to an inquiry from a media outlet, a summer intern acted outside the scope of his authority when he erroneously confirmed the names of the flight crew on the aircraft.

The NTSB does not release or confirm the names of crewmembers or people involved in transportation accidents to the media. We work hard to ensure that only appropriate factual information regarding an investigation is released and deeply regret today's incident.


Appropriate actions will be taken to ensure that such a serious error is not repeated.


On se souvient que les noms des pilotes du vol AF 447 ont été jetés en pâture aux médias de notre beau pays sans que cela ne choque grand monde. Je pense en particulier à ce journaleux du Figaro qui les a traîné dans la boue : Fabrice Amédéo, rédacteur en chef adjoint de ce canard. Soyez ignoble, vous serez récompensé !


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Landing at KSFO…





008.jpgI flew a mostly uneventful leg to SFO, the Big Sur Arrival to the Bridge Visual for Runway 28L. We set up and briefed for LNAV/VNAV approach in visual conditions. As we joined the final approach course ATC slowed us to 180 KTS and advised us of traffic for the parallel runway, a B767-300. The First Officer and I had the traffic in sight and told ATC. ATC advised us to maintain visual separation with the B767 and continue our approach for Runway 28L. As the B767 got closer it was apparent that we were getting uncomfortably close. We slowed further to 160 KTS to keep some distance between the B767 and ourselves. It was quite obvious that the B767 was becoming a threat. As the B767 flew through his and continued through our own approach course we were glad for the additional spacing that we had created. With the B767 well south of his and our runway approach and was probably a half mile or so to the left of our course and a mile or two ahead of us. (He really overshot his turn) ATC pointed out this obvious event and rather than have him cross in front of us again asked us to change runways and make Runway 28R our new landing runway. I disengaged the autopilot as ATC was issuing this new clearance and as anticipated we encountered the B767's wake turbulence. After getting through the wake turbulence I commanded the First Officer to deselect the flight directors and tune up Runway 28R localizer all the while keeping a very suspicious eye on the B767 as he accepted his NEW runway as well. Once again the B767 seemed to slightly over shoot his course and we deviated a little bit away from him to maintain safe spacing. Approaching 1,000 FT the First Officer confirmed with ATC that the B767 was really landing on 28L and that we were to land on 28R. ATC thanked us for our help and told us to continue to our landing runway, 28R. After landing (side by side with the B767) we turned off our runway and held short of Runway 28L). We thanked each other for the successful event.


The First Officer landed on Runway 28R at SFO. We proceeded to Taxiway T turnoff where we exchanged control of the aircraft. As the exchange was happening, we were instructed by SFOTower "cross Runway 28L expedite crossing aircraft on final." My First Officer acknowledged the crossing and I aligned my aircraft with Tango, added power to hurry across, I did my last check of 28L before crossing when I saw an Airbus going rapidly down the runway. I immediately brought my aircraft to a stop past the hold short line but before the runway edge lights. The Airbus on 28L stopped his aircraft short of Delta and called the Tower. SFO Tower sent the aircraft around, the Airbus on 28L cleared the runway at Delta and when the way was clear I taxied across 28L and on to my gate. I remembered later a partial clearance to another aircraft to expedite which I believe was the other Airbus on 28L. I am certain that if I had not stopped my aircraft we would have at least collided wingtips. There is not enough room to have an aircraft clear 28L at Delta and simultaneously cross an aircraft of Taxiway Tango.


We [were] flying the LDA PRM 28R in SFO. We were put 2.5 miles behind a 747-400 who was on the ILS 28L. The winds below 4,000 FT were 180 at 15 KTS and surface winds were 250 at 10 KTS. I asked to slow due to the 747's close proximity on the approach given the southerly winds that would blow the 747's wake into our path. The Controller seemed upset that we were concerned about the possible wake encounter and said that we could go missed if we had a problem. We broke out at 1,700 FT and stayed high and flew over the wake that we could clearly see due to the moisture in the air! My issue is with the Controller not having any situational awareness in regards to the 747 and the winds aloft considering the close proximity of the aircraft and these dangerous approaches. Smaller aircraft should be still given 5 miles behind a heavy on this approach considering how close the 2 runways are (750 FT)! This is an accident waiting to happen!

Lire la suite

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Asiana 214 : NTSB's final briefing


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Asiana 214 : NTSB briefing 10 juillet

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Asiana 214 : le briefing du NTSB

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Yemenia 626 : rapport final d’enquête technique

Image2.jpgLe rapport final de l’accident du vol Yemenia 626 est en ligne sur le site du BEA. Comme prévu, aucune trace dans ce rapport

-         Du niveau de sécurité lamentable de la compagnie Yémenia

-         De l’incapacité du Yémen à organiser son transport aérien

-         De l’incapacité des Comores à surveiller les exploitants se posant sur son territoire

-         De l’irresponsabilité de l’administration et du pouvoir politique français qui ont laissé (et continuent de laisser) des passagers embarquer sur les avions du Yémen


Le BEA a validé ce rapport…

13:43 Écrit par HMC | Commentaires (0)


Yemenia 626 : les experts judicaires concluent

20130630_1_5_1_1_0_obj4140803_1.jpgSelon un article de La Provence.com, les six experts désignés par les juges d'instruction de Bobigny considèrent que


"les causes déterminantes de l'accident sont des manœuvres par les pilotes contraires aux règles de l'art et une conduite du vol manifestement inadaptée aux situations rencontrées, aboutissant à une perte de contrôle totale de l'avion"


"l'équipage n'a pas utilisé les procédures prévues pour faire face aux situations particulièrement critiques pourtant clairement signalées"


Airbus inefficace. Puisque la qualité de la formation et du maintien des compétences des pilotes est mise en cause il faut se rappeler que depuis 2008 Airbus met à la disposition de Yemenia des experts techniques et des contrôleurs « pour former son personnel (pilotes et ingénieurs) et vérifier ses performances dans deux domaines spécifiques: entretien, d'une part, ingénierie et exploitation technique des aéronefs, d'autre part. ». C’était une des conditions pour que la compagnie Yemenia ne soit pas inscrite sur la liste noire européenne.


Quel était le contexte ? On ne peut se contenter de démontrer que l’équipage a commis une erreur. Il faut aussi décrire le contexte dans lequel cet accident s’est produit :


En Avril 2004, l’OACI dénonçait l’incapacité du Yémen à organiser son transport aérien.

En 2007, la DGAC interdisait le survol du territoire français par l’Airbus A310 70-ADJ suite à un contrôle SAFA

En avril 2008, l’Europe constatait que la compagnie Yemenia ne satisfaisait pas à certaines normes de sécurité définies par la convention de Chicago

Après l’accident du 29 juin 2009, l’EASA suspendait l’agrément d’organisme de maintenance accordé à Yemenia et la DGAC suspendait les CDN de 2 A310 immatriculés en France et utilisés par Yemenia


Et les Comores… Il ne fallait pas compter non plus sur l’administration des Comores pour surveiller efficacement les exploitants autorisés à se poser sur son territoire. L’audit de l’OACI effectué dans ce pays en mars 2008 qualifiait ses obligations de surveillance de « not implemented »

10:06 Écrit par HMC | Commentaires (0)


On reparle de TWA 800

twa800-floating.jpgCertains experts pensent que le vol TWA 800 a été percuté par un missile le 17 juillet 1996. Le NTSB a reçu une pétition contestant son rapport d’enquête technique. Il réagit :

June 28, 2013

WASHINGTON – Investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board will provide a background briefing on the NTSB’s four-year investigation into the probable cause of the TWA Flight 800 crash on July 17, 1996. Flight 800 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean shortly after takeoff from JFK airport in New York.

On June 19, 2013, the NTSB received a Petition for Reconsideration of the Board’s findings and probable cause determination regarding TWA Flight 800, pursuant to 49 CFR §845.41. This petition is currently under review.

Since the accident occurred 17 years ago, many who are now covering the petition filing are less familiar with the details and findings of the NTSB’s four-year investigation. This is why the NTSB is offering the background briefing on the TWA Flight 800 report.


DATE: Tuesday, July 2 at 2:00 pm EDT

LOCATION:NTSB Training Center
45065Riverside Parkway
Ashburn, VA20147

09:19 Écrit par HMC | Commentaires (0)


Fatigue : les experts l'affirment...

...si les Parlementaires européens votent en faveur du projet FTL de l'EASA, ils voteront contre l'avis des experts.

19:20 Écrit par HMC | Commentaires (0)


Fatigue : personne ne pourra dire "nous ne savions pas"


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Fatigue : séance publique au Parlement européen


Le programme et mes commentaires :



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